separate but equally bad? some socioeconomic context on east jerusalem and the west bank

Every few days after work, my friend will invite some of his colleagues over to his apartment in Ramallah. Several of them hail from East Jerusalem neighborhoods like Shua'fat and Beit Hanina. They smoke nargileh, tell stories, grill meat, watch Arabic music videos, and poke fun at each other in good spirit. As the night draws to a close, someone asks the group about the situation at Qalandiya, the main checkpoint between the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Everyone checks their phones to see if the roads are blocked because of protests. If so, the Jersualem residents stay and have another cup of tea (or glass of whiskey). If not, they head home to the other side of the wall, crossing from the Palestinian Authority-controlled West Bank into Israeli-annexed East Jerusalem, and get ready to make the commute again the next day.

It is common for Palestinians from East Jerusalem to come to the West Bank for work and play. Their friends who live in the West Bank cannot visit them in Jerusalem unless they are given the rare permit from Israel, so East Jerusalemites who work in the West Bank are the main thread connecting Palestinians living on each side of the wall. Palestinians who hold a blue Jerusalem residency card experience the occupation differently from those who hold the green identity card of the Palestinian Authority. Yet, emphasizing the Jerusalem-versus-West Bank division of Palestinians ignores important similarities across the two communities.

The spate of violence over the past month has some wondering: why Jerusalem? Despite the "lone wolf" nature of some of the recent attacks – including the incident at Ammunition Hill, the assassination attempt of Yehuda Glick, and the barbaric killings at Har Nof – many have suggested that the East Jerusalem context, in particular, might be enabling the violence, including some of the most outspoken critics of Israeli policies. Further, some suggest that East Jerusalemites are in a far more desperate situation than their West Bank counterparts. A recent article paraphrases Ghassan Khatib, currently Vice President of Birzeit University, noting "that poverty, unemployment, addiction and many other socioeconomic plagues [are] far worse in East Jerusalem than in the West Bank." Add to that the recent tensions over access to the holy sites, the argument goes, and we shouldn't be surprised that Jerusalem is the epicenter of violence.

Yet, others are surprised that the current conflict has flared most violently in the holy city. After all, Palestinian residents of Jerusalem possess the coveted identity cards that allow them to live in the city that Palestinians view as their future capital. Unlike West Bank residents, they are able to work in Israel, travel freely throughout the country, and access some of the same benefits as Israeli citizens. Arab public opinion expert Shibley Telhami tweeted on October 25: "Those arguing new Intifada unlikely in WB [the West Bank] say WB has too much to lose. But Jerusalem Palestinians have most to lose and they are leading way."

Do East Jerusalemites have more or less to lose than their counterparts in the West Bank from continued violent resistance? First, it is important to clarify what it means to be from "East Jerusalem." Subsequently, a brief analysis suggests that the socioeconomic characteristics and standards of living of the two populations are more similar than we think. Thus, if East Jerusalemites have more to lose from a continued uprising, it is not because they face far greater economic costs than those in the West Bank. Instead, what they risk that West Bankers do not is losing the less tangible, but no less powerful, symbolic benefit of being able to reside in the city that Palestinians consider their ultimate capital.

Jerusalem's Palestinian Residents: Living Between Two Worlds

At the conclusion of the 1967 War, Israel took control of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights. While the rest of the West Bank has remained under military occupation, Israel annexed the Palestinian-majority area of East Jerusalem. Jordan had controlled East Jerusalem between 1948 and 1967, but after the war Israeli jurisdiction was extended over the city. The Palestinian population in East Jerusalem was (and is) permitted to apply for Israeli citizenship, but one condition for obtaining it is swearing allegiance to the Israeli state. It is estimated that between 3-5 percent of Palestinian residents of Jerusalem have Israeli citizenship, while the vast majority have been given permanent residency through the possession of special Jerusalem identity cards.

In the early 1990s, Israel began to implement a closure policy whereby West Bank Palestinians needed permits to enter East Jerusalem and could only do so through Israeli-controlled checkpoints. In 2000, the Second Intifada began, setting off a wave of suicide attacks inside Israeli territory. Israel began construction of the separation barrier to deter such attacks, dividing Israel and the West Bank. The barrier does not follow the “green line,” the 1949 armistice lines that had served as the de facto borders between Israel and the Palestinian Territories. Israeli settlements east of the green line (in the West Bank) were mostly included on the Israeli side of the barrier. On the other hand, in the Jerusalem area, some Palestinian neighborhoods that are within the municipal boundaries were left on the West Bank side of the wall. Thus, a number of official Jerusalem residents live on the West Bank side of the separation barrier in neighborhoods such as Kafr 'Aqab, Ras Khamis, and Shua'afat camp, effectively cut off from city services. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) collects data on Palestinians in both "J1", the Israeli-annexed parts of East Jerusalem, and "J2" the Jerusalem-area neighborhoods in the West Bank that were never annexed by Israel and thus come under Palestinian Authority control. According to a PCBS survey in 2010, 11% of those sampled who resided in "J2" nonetheless had Jerusalem identity cards.

Geographic Definitions of East Jerusalem. Source: Terrestrial Jerusalem, "Jerusalem Atlas."

For the purposes of the discussion below, those who live within the Israeli-created municipal boundaries of the city are referred to as East Jerusalemites. By definition, these residents will also be in possession of the Jerusalem ID card. However, an East Jerusalemite's experience – the nature of interactions they have with Israelis and the Israeli government versus Palestinians and the Palestinian government, for example – is conditional on many details (i.e. their national ID, the ID of their spouse, the neighborhood they live in, where they work, where their kids go to school, etc) that are largely neglected by such a definition.

East Jerusalem and West Bank Compared

For good reason, most existing research has focused on comparing the living standards and opportunities of Israeli Arabs to their non-Arab counterparts. Similarly, the status of Palestinian residents of Jerusalem is often benchmarked against the status of Jewish residents of the city. Since East Jerusalemites do have residency claims in Israel, it is fitting to examine their opportunities and challenges in comparison to Jewish Israeli citizens. However, below I draw on multiple data sources to illustrate how socioeconomic outcomes compare between East Jerusalem Palestinians - who comprise about 300,200 in number as of 2012 - and West Bank Palestinians. This brief summary only paints a partial picture of an extraordinarily complex situation but, in broad terms, the two communities face a shared set of challenges.

Educational facilities and educational outcomes in East Jerusalem are often described as exceedingly poor. Existing research points to severe shortage of classrooms and substandard facilities for students in East Jerusalem. There is a lot of different data to contend with here, so the following may confuse more than clarify. The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (JIIS) 2013/2014 data reports similar average student-per-classroom rates (around 27-28) across Arab and Hebrew-language schools at the kindergarten, primary, and junior high school levels, however this appears to not include private schools. PCBS presents data on about 30,000 Palestinian students at the primary and secondary level living inside Jerusalem's municipal boundaries, of which 66% are in private schools. In private East Jerusalem schools, according to PCBS, the average student-teacher ratio is 19.3. The average number of students per classroom in these schools in East Jerusalem is 25.3. Yet, in 2012, Ir Amim and ACRI cite Jerusalem Education Administration data noting an average of 32 students per classroom in official elementary and high schools in East Jerusalem, compared to an average of 24-25 for West Jerusalem.

How do educational measures compare for those on the West Bank side? Palestinian students in "J2", the areas surrounding Jerusalem that were not formally annexed, are distributed more evenly across public, private, and UNRWA schools, but the majority (56%) are in government schools run by the Palestinian Authority. In government-run "J2" schools, the student-teacher ratio is 18.0. According to UNESCO data, the overall pupil-to-teacher ratio in lower secondary schools across the West Bank and Gaza is 20.9, but Gaza likely brings up the average. In PA-run "J2" schools, the average number of students per classroom is 24.5. These data suggest that classrooms and schools in both East Jerusalem and the West Bank may suffer from overcrowding. Of course, measuring students per classroom or teachers per student does not speak directly to the quality of education.

We also see similarities in terms of school completion. According to UNESCO statistics, dropout rates in lower secondary education in Palestine were around 13% in 2011, not including East Jerusalem. In East Jerusalem, Ir-Amim and ACRI report that the total dropout rate for all students was estimated at 13%, but the rates were higher when focusing exclusively on the secondary school-age population. For example, by 10th grade, an estimated 20% of children of the appropriate age were not enrolled in school. The PCBS reports an 11.1% dropout rate for 15- to 17-year-olds throughout the West Bank in 2011. Thus, this initial review suggests that dropout rates are indeed higher in East Jerusalem than the rest of the West Bank, but perhaps not by much.

Unemployment has historically been higher in the West Bank because Jerusalemites have the opportunity to work in either Israel or the West Bank, whereas West Bankers cannot work in Israel as easily, especially after the Second Intifada. In 2012, overall unemployment in the West Bank was 23.0%. While Israeli data does not disaggregate unemployment in Jerusalem between groups, unemployment rates are likely lower in Jerusalem. PCBS data shows that unemployment for the whole Jerusalem area, including non-annexed areas in the West Bank, was 17.6% as of 2013. However, part of the reason Jerusalemites are less likely to be unemployed is because they can access jobs in the West Bank. There are obvious costs to Jerusalemites working in the West Bank – i.e. the time, monetary, and even psychological costs of commuting to work each day. While the outcome is still better than being unemployed, it is worth noting that the marginal value of a given wage may be lower for a Jerusalem resident than a West Bank resident due to these costs. Those Jerusalem residents working in the city and Israel are concentrated in unskilled and low-wage (by Israeli standards) positions.

Median income in East Jerusalem is certainly higher than the rest of the West Bank, but so is the cost of living. A 2012 National Insurance Institute report, drawing on data from Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) Expenditure Survey, finds that Arabs in Jersualem had the highest incidence of poverty of any population in Israel: an estimated 75% of both families and individuals are in poverty. (The group with the next highest poverty rates was Arabs in Haifa and the North.) In general, nearly 60% of Arabs in Israel were defined as poor before taxes and transfers, and 54% after taxes and transfers. This compares to 26% of Jews in poverty before taxes and transfers and 14% after. The poverty line for the Israeli study NIS 2,256/month, and the poverty numbers for East Jerusalem have been criticized as being inflated since prices there are quite a bit lower than elsewhere in the country. By comparison, the poverty line for the reference household in the West Bank (2 adults plus 3 children) in 2011 was 2,293 NIS according to the PCBS methodology, and only 17.8% of West Bankers are below the poverty line after receiving assistance (20.2% before) in 2011.

Beyond Material Grievances

Clearly, there are many reasons violence may be most acute in Jerusalem rather than the rest of the West Bank that are not captured in a quantitative comparison of living standards. First, one cannot ignore the religious and symbolic dimensions of the most recent upsurge in violence – dimensions which are especially accessible and salient for Jerusalemites.

Second, there are organizational factors at work that are exploiting grievances and opportunities for violence. Groups such as Hamas and PFLP (both of whose members have been implicated in recent attacks) may be assisting and inciting populations in Jerusalem more than the West Bank for any number of reasons. (One possibility is that they would rather face the Jerusalem police than Fatah-affiliated Palestinian security forces and/or the IDF in the West Bank.) Third, in the urban agglomeration of Jerusalem, Jewish and Arab residents are living side-by-side in a way that not even Israeli settlers and Palestinians in the West Bank are. This presents plenty of opportunities for friction and violence in civilian areas.

Finally, the conflict is, of course, interactive: Israel responds to Jerusalem violence by blocking entrances to Arab neighborhoods, demolishing houses, and increasing surveillance and patrolling. These responses may increase likelihood of future altercations, and these continued interactions may best explain why conflict in Jerusalem has been simmering continually, albeit with a recent spike, since the killing of 16-year-old Mohammed Abu Khdeir in July. As long-time Jerusalem analyst Daniel Seidemann recently pointed out to me (in Twitter-speak): "Israeli policies in E Jslm since [19]67 have been: buy 'em (carrot) break 'em (sticks). Both work temporarily, fail over time." Now, as we are deep in the midst of a sequence of actions and reactions in Jerusalem, Palestinian actions cannot be understood absent the context of Israeli government's response. However, it is notable that Palestinians in the West Bank – with the notable exception of the car attack at Gush Etzion earlier this month – have remained relatively nonviolent by comparison, following the October deaths of two young teenagers at protests in Beit Liqya and Silwad, respectively, and incidents of settler violence, such as the recent mosque burning outside Ramallah and the torching of a woman's home in the village of Khirbet Abu Falah. Yet the often overlooked similarities in the socioeconomic contexts of Jerusalem and the West Bank, and the continued interaction between populations on both sides of the wall, provide a constantly renewable source of solidarity across the divide. Thus, we should not be surprised if events in the West Bank follow the trend set by Jerusalem, for better or for worse, in the coming weeks and months.

Note: I am grateful to Daniel Seidemann for comments on an earlier version of this piece. I have made minor modifications to the section on citizenship opportunities for East Jerusalem residents and the discussions of poverty and education data upon his suggestion.

my triumphant return to blogging: on the happy subject of ISIS

Why hello, blog of yore! I am so thankful to blogspot for not deleting my account due to inactivity. I just took a little trip down memory lane reading my old entries. Unfortunately, I think graduate school has made me smarter, but also a worse writer. So, apologies in advance for whatever may follow...

One thought I had recently that I wanted to share (in more than 140 characters, hence my resumption of blogging) draws from a recent op-ed I came across from Conservative MP Liam Fox. In it, he argues that the Cameron government should take immediate action in Iraq to check ISIS's power, except this time without seeking parliamentary approval, as Cameron attempted to do with Syria last year. (Interesting to hear a parliamentarian say so emphatically to the government: "Please ignore us!", but that's neither here nor there.) Fox's discussion of the threat that ISIS poses includes the following parenthetical aside: "I believe that calling the group by its chosen name, the Islamic State, is a political mistake." In other words, he does not think we should endorse ISIS as a member of the state system, and the title in acronym form does not do this as explicitly as does "Islamic State."

Well, why would ISIS bother to call itself a state? It is insulting to people like Fox, because it makes a mockery of the idea that the "international community", or the club of existing states or some subset thereof, determines what and what is not a state. Instead, what al-Baghdadi and his followers have established in parts of northeast Syria and northern Iraq is something which, at most, meets a very minimalist definition of the state -- a monopoly on the use of violence, without regard for whether or not that use of violence is "legitimate" (in either the popular sense of the word, or in Weberian terms). If we did not believe legitimacy to be an important aspect of the definition of states, then there would be no reason for an international organization such as the UN to have any control over what counts as a "state". As a permanent UN Security Council member, the UK has a vested interest in maintaining a strong role for the UN in regulating entry into the state system. In the meantime, groups like ISIS (and maybe groups like the MNLA in Northern Mali) attempt to leverage the fact that the international community's criteria for statehood seems to be arbitrary, at best, or strategically biased, at worst. See: Kosovo, Somaliland, Palestine, East Timor, South Sudan, etc. There are many reasons why these states, or aspiring states, have varied in the amount of international recognition they have received. However, whether the governing power holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of force does not seem to be a strict criteria for inclusion. It is clear that recognized states frequently use force in ways that seem likely to be viewed as largely illegitimate in the eyes of the population. The UN cannot and does not restrict entry or police its member states to ensure this.

So, ISIS, like many other groups before it, is creating its state by sheer force, and most likely intends for some time to ignore its juridical relationship to the formal, existing state system. While we have some good theory about why ethnic movements seek secession or independence (see e.g. Horowitz 2003, Walter 2006), can we use these theories to understand why groups like ISIS might seek to call themselves states? They don't fit the mold of a traditional separatist or secessionist movement. They are not currently seeking international recognition, although perhaps the use of the word "state" in their name suggests that someday they might. In any case, it is hard to imagine that any of Weber's three types of legitimate rule apply here.

how much stress can you handle?

The results from the Treasury's "stress tests" of the 19 largest U.S. banks will be announced on Thursday in what will also be a stress test for the American public. James Kwak nicely describes the fine line that Treasury will need to walk in deciding how much of the results to share with the public. This is an interesting case in which one could debate the relative merits of full transparency versus "enlightened" (giving Geithner and company the benefit of the doubt) leadership. If the tests demonstrate that the majority of bank assets are safely held in sufficiently capitalized banks, this might be a great boost for the financial sector and help accelerate a resumption of consumer and business lending. Yet, many seem to fear this will not be the case. Then the question becomes: how much bad news can the American public handle?

Kwak points out that it has been in the Treasury's interest until now to treat banks as "one undifferentiated mass," i.e. not elaborating on the distinction between the healthy and less healthy banks. We also may think it has served us, the American people, to think of the financial system in this way. But hopefully Thursday's announcement will reveal enough detail about particular banks for us to disentangle ourselves from this paralyzing picture of the system as one, irreparable blob. Treasury will have to make some tough calls, it seems. Hopefully they will share this news with the rest of us so we can all prepare for the tough clean-up process ahead.

Thanks are due to Blake for reminding me that I, too, have a blog.

obama and the work ahead: winning back the trust of a nation (and a world)

President-elect Obama will take office in January with the largest mandate for change in recent history. In addition to demonstrating leadership in restoring the health of the global economy, the new president will need to reverse the legacy of an incoherent and poorly executed strategy in the Middle East. Underlying both challenges -- first, containing the contagious financial crisis that now threatens many emerging market economies and second, securing a peaceful and prosperous Middle East -- is the key notion that the President must regain the trust and confidence of those who have the power to tip the scale back in a positive direction.

In the context of the global financial crisis, consumers, lenders, and investors have all suffered a major blow to their confidence. President Obama, in concert with world leaders, has the chance to make both tangible and symbolic moves to allow the markets to regain that confidence. Some aspects of the federal bailout of financial institutions (and possibly the auto industry) will surely need to be executed under Obama's watch. All of these moves must be made after careful deliberation but with clear and transparent intentions. Uncertain market interventions will only breed further uncertainty and risk aversion.

It will also be extremely important to reassure the development aid community -- the private sector and international lending institutions included -- to ensure that foreign assistance pledges to those most in need do not falter during these hard economic times.

In order to sustain growth and reform in the Middle East, the U.S. must work to win back the trust of the region's young, moderate populations. Many have made this argument, but a commitment to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to restoring stability and continuing political progress in Iraq, and to reforming the region's education systems and workforce development initiatives are all efforts that will help win back favor in the region and trust in U.S. intentions while, of course, contributing to the U.S.'s own strategic interests. According to a recent National Intelligence Council report, al-Qaeda is losing support for failing to address practical issues such as poverty, education, and unemployment in Muslim countries. While the same report also declares that the U.S. is waning in global leverage and influence, there is still an opportunity for the U.S. and other strong global powers to play a role in advancing economic growth in potentially volatile regions. Of the Middle East and North Africa, the report notes: "a greater emphasis on economics and, most importantly, greater participation of women in the work force may spur new forms of progressive Islam."

unfinished opinion / analysis

Advocating Citizen-Level Engagement in the Middle East

Event Summaries and Analysis from: "Passing a Flaming Torch: Mideast Issues & the Next President,” a lecture by Rami Khouri (Feb 20 2008, Georgetown University’s Center for Contemporary Arab Studies) and “Religious Freedom and Democratization in the Middle East: Links and Challenges” (Feb 22 2008, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Project on Middle East Democracy).

Diana Greenwald
February 25, 2008

Long before Americans were counting delegates on news tickers while nodding off to sleep each night, foreign policy analysts and regional experts in Washington began brainstorming how U.S. policy in the Middle East might take shape post-Bush and, eventually, “post-Iraq.” Washington has been abuzz with lectures, roundtables, newspaper editorials, strategy sessions, track-two dialogues and the like on how the U.S. might play a constructive role in the region – whether through official government bureaucracies such as the State Department and USAID or through private and independent non-profit organizations and foundations.

I attended two such events last week – a lecture by Rami Khouri at Georgetown University’s Center for Contemporary Arab Studies on February 20 titled "Passing a Flaming Torch: Mideast Issues & the Next President,” and a panel discussion on religious freedom and democratic development, jointly organized by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) on February 22. In the context of those discussions, summarized below, and the many challenges facing the region – strategic (i.e. terrorist movements, oil prices), humanitarian (i.e. the plight of Gazans, Iraqis) and existential (i.e. the fate of the Lebanese state) – it is hard to know what to do next. Here, I suggest renewed investment in strategies of “citizen-to-citizen diplomacy” that may serve as a useful starting point to reverse the trends of violence, extremism, and political apathy/acquiescence/detachment that are taking root in the broader Middle East. With an estimated one third of the region’s population between the ages of 10 and 24, the potential impact of these trends on the region’s youth is all the more disquieting.

With a new administration taking office in 2009, it is this author’s hope that the White House, U.S. government agencies, policymakers, NGO and business leaders, and individual American citizens will continue to take interest in the frustrated, disenfranchised, and politically apathetic youth in the Middle East through programs that promote civic advocacy and leadership, conflict resolution and peacebuilding, and entrepreneurship and innovation. Discussion of how these programs might work follow the summaries of the two events below. Please note that much of the speakers’ remarks are paraphrased.

***
Rami Khouri, political columnist and editor-at-large for the Daily Star newspaper and director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, identified ten themes characterizing recent social and political development in the Middle East that will continue to pose challenges for the next US administration, regional governments, and the international community. In introducing these themes, Khouri emphasized that there is a great degree of overlap between them and they cannot be assessed in isolation from one another:

1. Demographic changes and polarization – Specifically, the region has seen increasing polarization of urban populations along socioeconomic lines. These divisions are leading to urban “hopelessness” among the poorer classes. Khouri noted that similar conditions of severe domestic inequity preceded the rise of the region’s Islamist movements in the late 1970s. A timely article on the risk of rising inflation in the region recently appeared in the New York Times, to substantiate Khouri’s point about these socioeconomic tensions.

2. “Perpetual autocracy” – Whether in the region’s kingdoms or republics, autocratic leaders are turning to new strategies to legitimize their rule – many are relying on modernizing economic reforms to generate investment and provide jobs, however they are never quite able to “catch up” to their growing populations. The central government also seems to be shrinking in some countries however, Khouri stated, “where it does have control, it has more.” Unfortunately, there are no signs of credible transitions to democratic rule in the region right now, Khouri noted.

3. Reconfiguration of state power and authority – There has been a redefinition of multiple centers of political authority within and across traditional state boundaries, including tribal authorities and centers of religious leadership. People in the Middle East, Khouri explained, “are defining their own legitimate authorities” that do not always fit within the single, sovereign state system. This condition of multiple authorities within single sovereign states (i.e. the Hariri-led ruling coalition vs. the pro-Syria-Hizbollah-Aounist faction in Lebanon; the Hamas-led government in Gaza vs. Abu Mazen’s government in the West Bank, etc.) has often been exacerbated by U.S. and international involvement in the region. According to Khouri, this condition of multiple authorities within states is not sustainable, yet it appears that some form of national unity government will have to emerge out of these situations.

4. New balances between "state" and "sub-state" and sectarian identities – Related to the previous point, there are many new types of states, proto-states, and even semi-“city-states,” such as Dubai and Doha, Khouri explained. Sub-state identities (sectarian, tribal, etc.) are coexisting with these state-defined identities.

5. Increasing reliance on violence – Perhaps the most troubling trend that Khouri noted, violence has become a chronic, pervasive, 'normal' and accepted mean of political expression to a startling new degree. He points out that some of the recent violence in Beirut has not been due to governments or organized militias, but just troublesome youth and gangs that are not politically organized, but are committing acts of violence because, in Khouri’s words, they look at Hizbollah, the U.S., Israel, Syria, etc. and determine that “everyone else is doing it.” Violent conflict, while it has always occurred, now pervades the region. How, Khouri asked, can the U.S. address this trend with some 140,000 troops stationed in Iraq?

6. New context of self-assertion, defiance & resistance – Khouri points out that citizens of the Middle East are more actively fighting and resisting what they view as their oppressors, whether that is the Arab security state, Israel, the U.S. or another wielder of power. This challenge to authority is more insistent and open than it was before, and young citizens are fighting over the same issues that faced the generation before them: citizenship, inequity, occupation, repression, lack of accountability and the rule of law, etc. States have limited military capacity, or political will, to address this.

7. Continued centrality of the Arab-Israeli conflict – Khouri points out that with a long-termed, unresolved refugee situation and lack of an organized Palestinian state, this problem will not go away. Examples from Lebanon this summer such as the battles in Nahr al-Bared between the Lebanese army and Fatah al-Islam demonstrate how these refugee camps can be turned into breeding grounds for radicalization by groups who use them for this purpose.

8. New regional security balance – A new regional security architecture, "post-Iraq," will need to be defined. The current arrangement, whereby four non-Arab states are defining and controlling the security balance – the U.S., Iran, Turkey and Israel – is not sustainable, according to Khouri. There must be a shared security arrangement that is defined by regional participants and stakeholders, or else actors such as Hizbollah and Hamas will expectedly “step in to fill the vacuum.”

9. Need to assess and fight terrorism more effectively – The root causes of terror need to be more effectively researched and the U.S.-led war on terror needs to be declared a failure and its strategies reassessed, says Khouri. The U.S. needs to think about using its power in the world in a way that creates more “win-win” scenarios that acknowledge the interests of other actors, including the U.S’s adversaries, and potential shared interests between them.

10. The nexus of sovereignty / legitimacy / security / identity – Khouri’s final observation synthesized the nine points above. He concluded by remarking that most people in the region desire dignity and normalcy but do not feel they live in “sovereign states,” thus they are anxious to engage in self-defining identification and legitimization of their sources of authority. They are worried about their collective and individual security.

Khouri’s “flaming torch” analogy seems to be an apt one to describe the political climate the next American administration will inherit (and Khouri did point out that this is not only the U.S.’s problem by any means, but that a U.S. presidential election marks a convenient turning point) – a dangerous mix of plurality of power centers, polarization of the population along socioeconomic lines, disenchantment of the youth, and an increasing willingness to turn to violence as a means of resistance.

***

At the event hosted by the Wilson Center and POMED, moderated by Andrew Albertson (Executive Director, POMED), Thomas Melia (Deputy Executive Director, Freedom House), Joe Stork (Deputy Director, Middle East and North Africa Division, Human Rights Watch), and Thomas Farr (Visiting Associate Professor and Senior Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs, Georgetown University; former Director, U.S. Department of State Office of International Religious Freedom) each treated the issue of religious freedom and its relationship to democratic development and consolidation in the region and, more specifically, how the protection of religious freedoms might figure into U.S. democracy promotion and assistance efforts in the region.

Mr. Melia framed his remarks with the general observation that democracy assistance programs often leave out the traditionally “conservative,” religiously devout populations in the broader Middle East which, he stated, is a serious omission. Melia asked: how can we “make the sale” to an undecided, practicing Muslim that their interests are best advanced through a democratic political system?

Melia spoke about several challenges to engaging with religious and traditionally conservative populations, including the common fear in the region of “U.S.-style” democracy as a kind of socially progressive, “extreme” system of political freedoms to the point where traditional family values are perceived as threatened. Additionally, the U.S. government, Melia pointed out, “trips up” over this issue because of its desire to leave out entirely the question of religion when discussing democracy and political systems. Logically, the U.S. does not want to be involved in a discussion of the “correct” application of shari’a law, for example, or to be debating with Muslims on which interpretation of their religion and its texts they will be implementing. However, he implied, the alternative of completely ignoring the fundamental and important role that religion plays in many peoples’ lives in the region is a mistake.

Melia also pointed out the importance of examining the U.S.’s own path to democracy and how we have achieved a high degree of religious freedom in our own country as a way of knowing our own “story” before engaging in other regions.

Mr. Stork spoke of many of the inherent challenges and tensions in the question of religious freedom. He pointed out that the abridgement of freedom to practice and manifest religious belief –which is a more accurate characterization of what freedoms we are referring to when we say “religious freedoms” – is indeed a problem, but also bespeaks the larger, more complex challenge of the politicization of religion and the appropriation of religion and religious ideology by states, opposition movements, and other political actors.

The U.S. has sometimes been forced to take on issues of religious interpretation, something which Melia had earlier implied need not be part of our engagement strategy (i.e. instead of discussing which form of Islamic law and getting into doctrinal debates with Muslims, which is not our place, we should merely insure that the institutions and systems are in place that protect the right of citizens to debate these issues). The ambivalence that characterizes both Islamic political movements and the international response to such movements was exemplified by the ascendance in Algeria of the Islamic Salvation Front in the early 1990s. In dialogues with influential religious leaders in Egypt, Stork pointed out that Human Rights Watch had found a number of sympathetic voices among the religious establishment that were promoting tolerant views on issues such as the legal definition of “apostasy,” for example, that fell in line with international standards for the protection of human and minority rights (see, for example, this recent release by Human Rights Watch welcoming an Egyptian Administrative Court decision to allow Christian converts to Islam to “re-convert” back to Christianity, in spite of government policy that does not recognize these reconversions from Islam on individuals’ national identity cards.) Although, Stork stated, the final question is always what level of responsibility we expect from the state in enforcing these standards.

Thomas Farr concluded the panel by remarking that the “religious freedom deficit” is not only a humanitarian concern, but also a strategic one, for the United States. Farr pointed out that there seems to be an emerging consensus that a dearth of democracy leads to an absence of a certain level of human rights, which often includes an absence of religious freedom, so the existence of a democratic political system does indeed play a role in the level of religious freedom. However, according to Farr, this is an insufficient explanation. Cases like Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and even Indonesia show high levels of democratic development and civil liberties, but low levels of religious freedom. An emerging issue that we have unfortunately avoided, Farr pointed out, is that there is a problem with religious freedom and Islam, although both secular and theocratic regimes in the Middle East use and manipulate religion for political goals.

The problem with the American strategy up until now, Farr said, is that we have been largely on the defensive – responding to instances of religious persecution instead of attacking the very structures of persecution. We should, he says, be looking for opportunities to advance religious freedom as part of the advancement of democracy, keeping in mind that “if you don’t work out the balance between religion and state” and ensure that Muslims can debate issues of religion freely in a public space, you cannot hope for democracy.

Finally, returning to Thomas Melia’s opening question of why we do not engage with more conservative, traditionally religious voices in the region, Farr pointed out that all of the major foreign policy schools – liberal internationalist, neoconservative, realist – have a convergence of views on this point: they are averse to religion, and specifically Islam, being a part of the foreign policy question. Our “democracy dollars” have, in large part, avoided engagement with the religious establishment and have been attempting, without success, to “build civil societies and democracies as if religion was not the major driver” of self and collective identification in many parts of the world.

***

Where do we go from here? Given the dangerous trends identified by Rami Khouri, the paradoxes discussed by the panelists around issues of religious freedom and democracy, and the unpredictability of the current conflicts in Iraq, Israel and Gaza, and Lebanon, the best prescription for U.S. policy can be nothing but tentative.

To characterize it broadly, for now, the U.S. strategy must be an intense, non-ideological investment in the region’s promising youth and emerging civil society leaders. Two questions seem to follow from this suggested strategy:

1. Criteria for “engagement” – who are we willing to allow into the circle?
2. Type of “engagement” – what form of engagement and by whom?

Criteria for engagement – There is a need to allow more individuals in the region to be a part of the critical dialogue on the region’s future development. Much discussion has been given, at the institutional level, as to whether or not the U.S. and U.S. institutions should interact with Islamist parties and religious establishments and political movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Hamas in Palestine. It is important to keep in mind that the strategy promoted here is dealing primarily with youth, who may find themselves politically unaffiliated or apathetic, and not political parties or leaders of political parties. Or they may feel strongly, for instance, that a religiously conservative party such as the MB is less threatening than an authoritarian and corrupt party such as the NDP under Mubarak. The “lowest bar” we could set as a criterion for engagement, it seems, is that all actors who come to the table must reject violence.

Beyond nonviolence, what are the other criteria we could insist on? There is, it seems, certainly a necessity to tailor our level of engagement to depend on our strategic interests at the time – ranging from dialogue with the “other,” to lending capacity-building assistance, to developing and acting on our shared objectives. The political “moderates” – religious and secular – should be the primary targets for the highest-level of engagement. Those who, while still nonviolent, tend toward fundamentalist views (i.e. religious – those who advocate a literal interpretation of religious law and/or hold very traditional views of the role or women, religious minorities, etc. – or nationalist – “extreme nationalism” is more tricky to define: those whose nationalist identity defines all political views and affiliations and/or advocate for secession, new state boundaries, etc.) may be kept at arms-length by being included in a roundtable or dialogue initiative that also brings more moderate voices to the table.

Type of engagement – As stated earlier, the best forms of engagement are programs that promote civic advocacy and leadership, conflict resolution and peacebuilding, and entrepreneurship and innovation. These programs have a history of being best implemented by non-governmental institutions and foundations in the U.S. without partisan allegiances or political agendas. The programs should clearly not be packaged as wholesale “democracy” promotion for many reasons, not the least of which the fact that those actors whom we are primarily including in the process – a generation of politically-alienated youth who do not whole-heartedly identify with their state, monarchy or republic, nor with the various opposition movements or leaders available to them, secular or religious, violent or non-violent – are likely not motivated to achieve change through procedural or institutional avenues such as legal or judicial reform. Then, of course, there are the hard lessons we have learned from past efforts in Iraq and elsewhere to “wipe the slate clean” and parachute in a democratic system that make a strong case for not relying on such outcomes.

Thus, this policy cannot attempt to forcibly export ready-made democratic institutions or cultural norms, however, it also cannot adopt the traditional realist framework that, as Khouri aptly described in Cold War-era lingo, mercilessly divides all states as either “[military] targets” or “markets.” It is in our strategic – not just moral – interest to find out what is going on inside these countries. For example, what are university students in Syria, Palestine, or Egypt thinking and saying about the regional political landscape? What are their opinions on what the role of the international community should be, their thoughts on religion and the protection of minority rights, and their views on the Arab-Israeli conflict? If we are, indeed, still in a “war of ideas,” it should not be one in which we are hoping to sell secularism, progressive liberalism, or U.S.-style democracy, but one in which we demonstrate that, at the most basic level, American citizens want citizens of the broader Middle East to command their own political reality, based on the goals we all share of living in dignity, peace, and security. Let us not, therefore, think of it as a war but, instead, as an exchange of ‘best practices’ toward achieving these goals and an acknowledgement that the domestic political realities in the Middle East will only be transformed through the sustained involvement of its own citizens in the process. A diverse group of voices should be included in this discussion, so that we come as close as possible to representing a microcosm of the regional landscape, with its multitude of political and religious power centers.

A policy that relies on empowering the region’s young, emerging leaders may take a long time to bear fruit, however it is the only certain way to redefine the U.S.’s commitment to the region in the eyes of those who are most susceptible to be tempted toward violent or extremist means. While these programs do require personnel, resources, training, and time, they are far cheaper, less invasive, and less risky than military occupations. This strategy is talking to one person at a time – it is a micro-level effort. It is not an imperialist imposition of a superior political system or way of life: it is a constantly open and free dialogue. Finally, it is a strategy that is not based on military might or the threat of sanctions, but on the hope (to inadvertently borrow a much-worn presidential campaign slogan) that by showing we are interested enough to talk to the next generation of leaders in the region, we will gain their respect and trust.

her residence is an official jail now

"'Her residence is an official jail now,' said a senior police officer at the scene after daybreak as officers in riot vests and carrying batons descended from buses to man the barricades set up around a 1-km perimeter.

'So no one can come out, and no one can meet her,' he said. 'If they try to take the law into their own hands, then we will resort to all means necessary, including charging with batons and tear gas.'"

("Pakistan's Bhutto detained ahead of mass protest," Reuters, 12 Nov 2007)

democracy crumbling...

and what are we to do?

Pakistan

Georgia

compromise

Freedom of expression. Public control of decision-making processes. Power sharing. Fair and legitimate representation. Accountability of elected leaders. The theoretical tenets of a functioning democracy.

Lofty theoretical ideals that, when all the diverse voices of the multitude have expressed their opinions in democracy's cherished spirit of liberty and tolerance, must conclude in one procedural event in order that something, actually, gets done: compromise.

When we talk of "political progress" and the lack thereof in Iraq, we are talking of this: compromise. Compromise on institutional arrangements, on control of Iraq's natural resources, compromise on de-Baathification, compromises toward a ceasefire between warring militias, compromise...

If only some of the above were to occur, both Republicans and Democrats would shower praise on the Baghdad government. Yet now, as untested political alliances in Iraq can prove deadly, American politicians and presidential hopefuls launch childish retorts at each other across the aisle. When will Iraqi politicians finally achieve that lasting degree of political accommodation? How about when the American ones do. This will only happen when both parties agree to stop caring who gains credit in 2008 for Iraq's successes and who is blamed for its failures. When we can agree on a way forward in Iraq that seems at least somewhat sensible because, lets face it: no one has any idea what will really work...
Sigh. I'm not holding my breath.

ADDENDUM: Just got a chance to read the Economist's argument for why we shouldn't withdraw now.

discussing the past

The Israeli government agreed to allow the use of a textbook in Arab schools that presents the view of the 1948 war and creation of the state of Israel as al-nakba, or "the catastrophe," and a former education minister claims that it will encourage Palestinians and Arabs to "take up arms against Israel."

Right-wing loyalists in Israel are afraid of the potential impact: "Once the Arab pupils are taught that the establishment of Israel was a disaster, they might infer that they should be fighting against us," said Limor Livnat, Knesset member and former Education Minister from the Likud Party.

...Because pretending the nakba view doesn't exist has worked so well?

When Livnat was asked in a 2004 interview with Haaretz what she would propose for a new education system in Iraq, she stated:

"My proposal for Iraqi schools is exactly what I am doing here. To teach heritage, to teach democratic values and ideas, to make sure that there is freedom of speech, freedom of thought, that there is room for a variety of ideas and to teach the children to be independent and part of the democratic free world."

Anyone who has stated such objectives should applaud the Israeli government's recent decision: it is a small, but symbolic, step toward free and democratic discussion by expanding access to alternative opinions on what is perhaps the #1 most emotional and controversial issue in the region's history.

sadness

I feel so alienated from both political parties. The bill that was just passed by the House of Representatives by a 223-201 vote calling for withdrawal from Iraq by 2008 has made clear a set of priorities that I have somehow failed to adopt but, apparently, everyone else has: we can only afford to continue to provide army personnel to train the Iraqi military and counter-terrorist operatives to protect our diplomats. Meaning that the U.S. is on the path to another bout of post-traumatic international isolationism, unresponsive to humanitarian crises? I can't say that I know what to do, but providing military training and assistance is only part of the solution. When/if the violence subsides in Iraq, the U.S. needs to be fully committed to maintaining a cease-fire, providing emergency relief services and aid, and then to beginning to build the infrastructure for sustainable local and state institutions that can provide basic public services. "Bring the troops home" and care for our returning soldiers: yes, perhaps it is time. But then begins the hard work of surveying the destruction and the level of material and economic investment that will be needed in the coming years - from Iraqis and the international community - to rebuild the country.

"surrender or die"

What happens when that choice is given to Islamic militants?

Perhaps Pakistan's President, General Pervez Musharraf, should have consulted with the Lebanese Army - which has been battling Fatah al-Islam fighters for over a month and a half - before issuing such an ultimatum to the extremists who sieged the Red Mosque in Islamabad last week. There are lessons to be learned from Northern Lebanon:

Those who are ordered to surrender do not consider it, talking instead of martyrdom.

Those who may want to surrender cannot: The Lebanese media has reported that Fatah al-Islam is fighting in groups, rather than as individuals, so that commanders can "keep an eye on their fighters" and prevent them from surrendering.

Finally: those who do not deserve to die, too often, do.

remember the rest of the world?

I am currently trying to find TV news coverage of the violence in Lebanon today and CNN is covering recently liberated mother and baby humpback whales, a poll of viewers on who the next 'American Idol' should be, and a popular video on YouTube of the "one-legged salsa sensation." While CNN's website has video coverage of the fighting between militants and the armed forces in Tripoli which left over 40 dead and scores injured by the end of the day, the "most watched" video feeds linked from the homepage "Legless Chihuahuas Seek Home," "Father Microwaves Baby," "Making Movies, Making Love" and a video segment on McCain using the f-word to respond to a criticism of his inattention to the immigration issue.

Seems that this is a combination of two things:

1. TV coverage has receded so far behind web-based media in its ability to keep up with news stories that they don't even try to compete, and instead cover "human interest" stories (or, worse, they create stories based on the web itself - see previously mentioned You Tube feature), and - because remember: cnn.com, not the TV news program, is responsible for featuring the legless chihuahua content -
2. American media outlets feel no significant demand from our population to cover news events in the rest of the world - or, arguably, news in any form - because we are perfectly happy to remain ignorant until we are materially affected by such events.

I do not want to make the argument that instability in the Middle East does materially affect us because:

1. ...well...do I have to? Isn't this already abundantly clear? and
2. even if it does not directly impact your life tomorrow, shouldn't you still know what is going on with your fellow humans?

"my country, my country"

I watched the elegant documentary, "My Country, My Country," by Laura Poitras, about life surrounding the 2005 elections in Iraq. Poitras, present for a Q&A after the screening, has the serious demeanor of someone who has just left behind a world of trauma and violence. In "My Country," she observes the preparations for the election through both the lens of a Sunni doctor and his family as he campaigns for a seat in the new National Assembly and the side of the military and logistical preparations for the elections by the occupying forces.

As audience members launched into question-cum-diatribes on the danger of the rise of Iraq's Shi'i majority as a satelite of Iranian strategic influence, their language, on its non-human scale, couldn't have clashed more with that of Poitras' film - which was simply that of one human telling the tragic stories of her fellow humans.

Poitras did not travel with an interpreter and is not, to my knowledge, conversant in Arabic. Yet somehow, as if to confirm her film's message, she was able to capture the sincerest and rawest of interactions around her and compose these fragments in a way that conveys more than the sum of its parts, something which the international media has failed to do when covering this war.

This documentary does not drown in familiar repetitions of the appalling scope of the war's damage. Instead, it takes us to Baghdad and calls for help in such a reasonable and sustained way that it is impossible to ignore. As the film's subjects go about their lives with violence incessantly rumbling on their doorstep, we can't help to try to take some of their burden with us. As Doctor Riyadh and his family campaign, treat patients, go to school, eat family meals, vote, swat at flies, shave, get married, and live through war, we let their lives and the backdrop of violence seep into us, as the director herself must have done over the course of her year in Iraq.

sacrifice and loss

Saddam Hussein was executed as Eid al-Adha began - a Muslim holiday to commemorate the sacrifice of Ismael, son of Abraham and one of the prophets of Islam. The feast of the sacrifice.

Based in that belief of something higher, sacrifice has survived well beyond the times of Ismael as the most desparate and honorable route for achieving good in our world. It is always permitted and often encouraged. When an act of the will is framed as "sacrifice," it is somehow above criticism.

When Saddam was being taunted at the gallows, he must have envisioned himself above the jeering observers both literally, on an elevated platform, and figuratively in the rankings of honor, manliness, and sacrifice. Unsound reasoning for the disturbed leader who oversaw a murderous regime, but reasoning which both individuals and societies fall back on nonetheless, in self-defense, to justify loss.

Sacrifice is potentially dubious when it entails expectation of something in return, but it is this type of calculation that characterizes almost all human decision-making: give something in order to receive something else that is more useful or more gratifying. Those who are willing to give something valuable or dear are all the more revered for their sacrifice. When we claim to be making a sacrifice, we can only hope that there is some tending the scales of justice and due reward.

Then, there are those situations of loss without reason, compensation, or meaning which we, try as we might, cannot seem to fit into the framework of sacrifice and justice. Iraq is, just as Lebanon was and may be again, violence with no victor or vanquished. It is loss on top of more loss - loss for all sides. Losses of credibility and legitimacy, lost lives, lost money, lost opportunities and lost time. There is nothing to be won here anymore.

Maybe it is for these reasons that, finally, 58 percent of our country wish this president would just, well, LEAVE.

I resent this administration enormously. I think that stubborn warmongering without any acknowledgement of its possible consequences is immoral. But, when I went to the antiwar protests on the mall this weekend, I felt like I was watching myself four years ago: hopelessly and powerlessly chanting: "What do we want? PEACE. When do we want it? NOW!" This time, though, I don't know of any frat boys who are sitting in front of the news cheering "Yeah! Fuck Iraq!" as they watched the flashes of light explode in night footage from Baghdad. This time, I don't know anyone who doesn't want peace, including the much maligned neocons. We all want peace - as I believe all people do in the midst of war - but it is this unstoppable and self-perpetuating violence that is the greatest tragedy of our time.

the coup

So what is a coup, anyway?
The Palestinian government, led by Hamas, has accused Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas of trying to orchestrate "a coup against Palestinian legitimacy and the will of the Palestinian people" by calling for elections to solve the escalating crisis between Hamas and Fatah loyalists. Really? Perhaps strategically unwise, yes, but a coup attempt? I don't think so. By contrast, an opposition leader in Zimbabwe recently voiced his rejection of President Mugabe's ruling party's attempt to extend their rule as a "civilian coup," claiming that "no person should run the country without being mandated by an election. The decision to unilaterally amend the constitution without national consensus amounts to a civilian coup."

Meanwhile, this month in Beirut's Martyr's Square has been designated by some part of a greater attempt by Hizbollah and other opposition groups in Lebanon to oust the Siniora-led government in a popular - and, up until now, largely peaceful - coup. The 'Aqoul blog has an interesting discussion on the strategic use of the language of nationalism and legitimacy in this context, comparing the current demonstrations to the March 14 movement.

Does the definition of a coup depend on the objectives of the actors, the choice and legitimacy of the means, and/or the political arrangement that results?

the precarious republic

"Hizbullah: 'There Will Be Demonstrations'" (Daily Star, 11/14)
I am incredulous of Lebanese politics, once again.

eternal return

Robert Kagan's monthly Washington Post column appeared today and it is sobering yet worthwhile reading.

Here is the email I wrote him in response:*



"Mr. Kagan,

I was intrigued to read your column in the Washington Post today. Having graduated from Georgetown and spent most of my summer in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, I can confirm that many in the region agree with you: Democrat, Republican, it's all the same. But it is not necessarily the recurring doctrine of military engagement (the characteristically American 'belief in the utility and even justice of military action,' as you put it) that accounts for their defeated indifference. Rather, many are repelled by American policy in the region since, quite simply, the birth of Israel: the birth then of one of the most sturdy alliances in the post-World War II era.

The unquestioning American support for the state of Israel since its formation is, in the opinion of many Arabs I met, further substantiation to your claim that '[h]istorically, and especially in the six decades since the end of World War II, there has been much more continuity than discontinuity' in our American foreign policy. In the opinion of more than a few people in the region, this is America's great downfall.

Simply my observations.

So, it seems that at least there is some type of consensus. What you have predicted is a devastating possibility, indeed -- that when this new Congress is elected, then when this rogue administration is finally laid to rest, and, perhaps much later, whenever this disastrous military campaign finally ceases ('when the smoke [quite literally] clears,') you, the rest of the world, and I will still see 'much the same America.' "

Here I do not intend to take a position on the justifications for the relationship between the US and Israel, one way or the other. I am just pointing out that we are each disenchanted with American policy for different reasons. What we have in common is understanding the Democrats and Republicans in a relativist and almost apathetic fashion.
The politicians and policymakers seem to do the same things over and over.
The eternal return.
However, while the basic ideology may remain the same, this administration has created some very new and alarming problems in its implementation.



*My logic: if he doesn't read it -- and I was already shafted by a semi-celebrated intellectual this week -- at least you, my loyal fan base, will.

why bush doesn't read the paper

"It had been almost a year since I was in the Iraqi capital, where I worked as a reporter in the days of Saddam Hussein, the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, and the occupation, guerrilla war and religious resurgence that followed. On my return, it was difficult to grasp how atomized and violent the 1,250-year-old city has become. Even on the worst days, I had always found Baghdad's most redeeming quality to be its resilience, a tenacious refusal among people I met over three years to surrender to the chaos unleashed when the Americans arrived. That resilience is gone, overwhelmed by civil war, anarchy or whatever term could possibly fit. Baghdad now is convulsed by hatred, paralyzed by suspicion; fear has forced many to leave. Carnage its rhythm and despair its mantra, the capital, it seems, no longer embraces life."

(Anthony Shadid, The Washington Post, 10/29/06)

fear/shock and awe

I was just shocked by something I saw on CNN.

I never dreamt I would see our country become the type of place where I would see such a blatant and deceptive piece of fear propaganda. I saw this air during a commercial break in the normal newscast.

WHO is buying this message?
LEAD me to these people so that... I can stare at them, dumbstruck.

the muddy throne

I was reading Nietzsche while waiting outside Chief Ike's Mambo Room on Columbia Road for the 42 bus. It was a gray day.

"State I call it where all drink poison, the good and the wicked; state, where all lose themselves, the good and the wicked; state, where the slow suicide of all is called 'life.'"

Thus spoke Zarathustra.

"Behold the superfluous! They gather riches and become poorer with them. They want power and first the lever of power, much money - the impotent paupers!

Watch them clamber, these swift monkeys! They clamber over one another and thus drag one another into the mud and the depth. They all want to get to the throne: that is their madness - as if happiness sat on the throne...

My brothers, do you want to suffocate in the fumes of their snouts and appetites? Rather break the windows and leap to freedom.

Escape from the bad smell! Escape from the idolatry of the superfluous!"

Thus spoke Zarathustra while two middle-aged Hispanic men sitting next to me were working through a stack of $5 scratch tickets with, alas, no riches to be won.